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ABSTRACT 
Smarter people do not inherently make for better parents. Absent abuse or neglect, a parent 
with a low intellectual quotient runs the risk of losing their children to the state. This Article 
addresses intellectual disability as a ground for termination of parental rights, and illustrates a 
general understanding on what intellectual disability is. More notably, this Article is the first to 
provide a complete state survey on intellectual disability as a ground in termination of parental 
right statutes, and specifically addresses state's termination statutes that epitomize overboard 
intellectual disability language and narrow intellectual disability language. With the disability 
described and the statutory language flushed out in the body of the Article, an argument is 
subsequently made on the type of language states should consider employing to afford more 
protections for the average intellectually disabled parent from state action. These parents should 
not rely on being dealt an enlightened judge who can balance the scales of justice imperially; in 
other words, a judge who does not adhere to the arbitrary presumption that all intellectually 
disabled parents are unfit to care for their children. This Article concludes by articulating a 
straightforward notion: in order to preserve the family nucleus for non-severe intellectually 
disabled parents, states must cease employing overbroad statutory language. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"I'm not a smart man, but I know what love 
. "1 
lS. 
In 2013 an Oregonian couple had 
their first son removed from their home 
following a family member reporting 
neglect to the state's child welfare agency. 
Pursuant to the report of alleged neglect, the 
Department of Human Services began 
investigating the parents. The department 
found no signs of abuse, but reported in their 
findings that the parents both have below-
average IQs. The state agency also found 
representations of the struggles and 
frustrations people with learning disabilities 
face when attempting to be parents. In 
reports of concerns about the couple's 
parenting skills, a Mountain Star 2 case 
worker recalled having to prompt the two 
parents to have Christopher wash his hands 
after using the toilet and to apply sunscreen 
to all of his skin rather than just his face. 
Upon this information, the state removed 
Christopher and placed him in foster care. 
Then in 2017, the couple had a 
second son, Hunter. The state took custody 
of Hunter as well. However, this time the 
state removed the couple's second son 
directly from the hospital following his 
birth. 3 The state's justification for taking 
Christopher and Hunter away from their 
parents is grounded in the parent's limited 
cognitive abilities that interfere with their 
aptness to safely parent the children. 4 
Reunification is being sought but has yet to 
be achieved. The children remam 
sequestered from their parents by residing in 
the state's foster system. In light of this 
story, and many others, one question 
surfaces in the mind: are individuals with 
average to high IQs inherently better parents 
because of their ample cognitive ability? 
For many, the ability to be a parent 
and raise children is taken for granted. Good 
parents should not have their parental rights 
terminated. Absent true abuse or neglect, 
like in the case outlined above, parents with 
limited cognitive ability5 can have a basic, 
fundamental right terminated: the right to 
make decisions concernmg the care, 
custody6, and control of their children7. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has long 
recognized this fundamental right of 
parents. 8 Nevertheless, parents with below 
average IQs have been and continue to be 
denied full enjoyment of their rights with 
respect to care, custody, and control of their 
children because of a condition they have, 
not a behavior they exhibit. 9 
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This article will discuss what 
intellectual disability is, explore the current 
landscape of state statutes addressing 
intellectual disability in termination of 
parental rights, and finally propose that 
states should eliminate overbroad 
intellectual disability language in their 
termination of parental rights statutes. Part I 
of this Article will provide an in-depth 
definition of intellectual disability and its 
sub-classifications. Fallowing this definition 
section, Part I will then provide brief 
background information on the description 
and definitions of intellectual disability. This 
Article disallows any in-depth historical 
discussion on the background of intellectual 
disability, mental retardation, and mentally 
disability. Thus, an in-depth historical, 
socio-economic, and social-psychological 
background of the aforementioned 
classifications will not be discussed in this 
article. Part II will discuss the current 
landscape of state statutes addressing 
intellectual disability as a ground for 
termination of parental rights. Additionally, 
this section will analyze the narrow and 
broad language present in state's termination 
statutes. Finally, Part III will offer a 
proposal to states to recognize and be 
cognizant of the varymg classes of 
intellectual disability and, thus, protect mild 
and moderate intellectually disabled parents 
by using specific, narrow language in their 
termination of parental rights statutes. 
I. DESCRIPTION AND DEFINTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
In order to understand the anatomy 
of a problem, one must first have a skeletal 
framework. To begin piecing this framework 
together, a minor description of intellectual 
disability will be provided. The description 
provided in the subsequent paragraph is 
essential for the reader to cognize this form 
of disability, and for the development of this 
article's analysis. 
It has been estimated that in the 
United States there are at least 4.1 million 
parents with disabilities who have minor 
children. 10 This group represents 6.2 percent 
of the parenting population. 11 No national 
study has been conducted to identify the 
total number of parents with disabilities who 
have been involved in the child welfare 
system. 12 However, the National Center on 
Parents with Disabilities and their Families 
analyzed data from 19 states and found that 
12.9 percent of children removed by child 
welfare services had a caregiver with a 
disability. 13 Multiple studies have revealed 
that 30 to 50 percent of parents with 
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intellectual disabilities lose custody of their 
biological children. 14 
The definition of intellectual 
disability will be defined in accordance with 
the current understanding of this form of 
disability. For clear comprehension, the 
definition of intellectual disability will be 
delineated below. 
A General Definition of Intellectual 
Disability 
Intelligence has systematically been 
defined using the Intelligent Quotient (IQ) 
test. 15 Some scholars have asserted that 
Intellectual Disability "is not a disease, 
disorder or disability." 16 Instead, it is a label 
for a diverse group of people. 17 Individuals 
labeled as intellectually disabled share 
characteristics: limitations in intelligence 
and deficits in adaptive skills. 18 The 
American Association on Mental 
Retardation lists these specific examples of 
adaptive behavior skills: receptive and 
expressive language, gullibility, money 
concepts, using transportation and doing 
house-keeping activities. 19 These 
characteristics suggest that this group of 
individuals are homogenous. In fact, they 
are not homogenous or monolithic. These 
individuals are a heterogeneous, non-
monolithic group who are categorically 
subdivided into mild, moderate, and severe 
forms of intellectual disability. 20 
1. Severe Intellectual Disability 
Severe intellectual disability 1s 
relatively marked by an IQ of thirty-five or 
lower. 21 It is often characterized by 
"organically based retardation." 22 
Organically based retardation denotes 
genetic, chromosomal, and other biological 
etiologies. 23 This group constitutes a large 
portion of individuals with serious birth 
defects and physical impairments. 24 Those 
with severe intellectual disabilities usually 
need lifelong support. 25 Moreover, 
individuals with severe intellectual disability 
are able to learn simple daily routines and to 
engage in simple self-care. However, these 
individuals need supervision in social 
settings and often need family care to live in 
a supervised setting such as a group home. 26 
For example, an Iowan mother had her 
parental rights terminated because her 
behavior mimicked behaviors of individuals 
who are severely disabled: 
[she had] difficulty 
overcoming her intellectual 
impairment to adequately 
provide a safe and reliable 
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home for [the child]. 
Furthermore, [the mother] 
was unable to care for [the 
child] without relying heavily 
on service providers and her 
mother. She frequently 
became angry while 
attempting to provide for [the 
child] needs and developing 
mobility. [The mother] 
demonstrated a sustained 
inability to understand [the 
child's] developmental stages 
with age appropriate 
. 27 expectations. 
The categorical subdivision, severe, 
will not be discussed further in detail, for it 
is not the sole focus of this Article. This 
class of intellectually disabled individuals 
needs daily assistance for the most 
pedestrian of tasks, let alone has the 
requisite skill set to care for a child. 
However, to entirely omit this subdivision 
would be improper, and hinder the reader 
from graspmg the limited scope of 
background provided in this Article. The 
extent this class will be discussed hinges on 
state statutory language in later sections of 
this article. 
2. Moderate Intellectual Disability 
Moderate intellectually disabled 
individuals have a relative IQ range of 
thirty-five to forty-nine. 28 This group 
roughly comprises ten percent of the total 
population.29 With support and training, this 
group can live and, or develop the requisite 
skill set to successfully live on their own. 30 
Similar to severe, moderate intellectual 
disability stems from organic causes, such as 
chromosomal abnormalities, birth defects, or 
brain mJury. 31 Dissimilar to severe, 
individuals with moderate intellectual 
disability can take care of themselves and 
others, travel to familiar places in their 
community, and learn basic skills related to 
safety and health. Their self-care requires 
little to no support. Unlike the classification 
of severe, this class of moderate 
intellectually disabled individuals will be 
discussed further in this Article. 32 
3. Mild Intellectual Disability 
The majority 33 of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities are classified as 
mild. 34 This category of individuals has an 
IQ range of fifty to seventy. 35 These 
individuals can learn practical life skills, 
which allows them to function in ordinary 
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life with nominal levels of support, or no 
support at all. 36 For example, when a father 
sought support from social services during a 
period of impoverishment, rendering the 
fathers home without food or electricity, 
social services did not later release the child 
back into the fathers care. 37 Subsequently, a 
social services agent filed a petition to 
terminate parental rights of the father. 38 
There was no evidence bearing on the issue 
of abuse or neglect of the child, and the 
child was never returned to the father from 
social services. 39 A psychiatrist evaluated 
the father and conjecturally declared the 
father intellectually disabled due to his 
illiteracy.40 The father's intelligent quotient 
was never measured. 41 During trial, the 
lower court relied on the psychiatrist's 
speculative report and testimony, and 
rendered their decision against the father. 42 
The case outlined above is merely one of the 
many examples of the problems and 
prejudices parents with or perceived as 
having intellectual disability face m 
American jurisprudence. 
Unlike the fact pattern provided 
above, individuals in this subdivision are 
almost always diagnosed when they are in 
an environment of curricular development, 
such as a school.43 When individuals are not 
in such environments, they become so 
integrated into society, they cannot be 
distinguished from non-intellectually 
disabled persons. 44 Aside from obtaining 
social benefits and support and assistance 
from family and friends, individuals in this 
group can live independently and enter the 
job market. 45 From this point forward, the 
discussion of intellectual disability will refer 
strictly to parents who fall within the 
classifications of moderate and mild. 
II. THE CURRENT STATUTORY 
LANDSCAPE: LAW SURROUNDING 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITY 
Disability is one of the only grounds 
for termination based on a parent's 
condition, rather than a parent's behavior. 46 
While no state says that disability can be 
grounds by itself for termination of parental 
rights, if disability is included as grounds for 
termination, it can become the main focus of 
a child protection case. 47 
A State Responsibility and Action 
in the Child Welfare System 
Child welfare agencies are laudable 
systems of "service designed to promote the 
well-being of children by ensuring safety, 
achieving permanency, and strengthening 
families to care for their children 
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successfully." 48 States are primarily 
responsible for the child welfare systems. 
State law governs cases in these systems; 
despite the fact states receive federal aid and 
funding. 49 State statutes govern every aspect 
of a child welfare proceeding. For example, 
statutes govern who may determine when an 
investigation must be made into allegations 
of child abuse or neglect, what types of 
services the family may receive to promote 
reunification, and when termination of 
parental rights are appropriate, thus 
rendering the family nucleus obsolete. 50 
Aptly stated by Justice Ginsburg, the later 
type of state action outlined above is 
"among the most severe forms." 51 
B. Termination of Parental Right 
Statutes 
Like most state statutes, child 
welfare statutes are verbose. Yet these 
statutes are purposely vague. Vagueness 
creates flexibility with regard to judicial 
discretion. Vague language in these statutes 
permits judges to exercise broad discretion 
in deciding child welfare cases. 52 In 
everyday cases, this type of discretion and 
flexibility is of course desired, if not 
appropriate. 53 Nevertheless, when 
termination proceedings are based on 
grounds of intellectual disability, this 
judicial discretion opens a conduit for legal 
bodies 54 to give way to bias and 
presumptions when determining the 
outcome of a proceeding, hearing, or case. 55 
States walk a tight rope when 
balancing the rights of the parent and the 
rights of the child. Naturally, states take 
diverse approaches in their statutes in order 
to balance the state's interest in the child and 
the parent's interest in the child. 56 State 
statutes vary in terms of grounds included 
for termination of parental rights and in the 
level of specificity with which those grounds 
are defined. 57 The more favorable state 
statutes do not deem intellectually disabled 
parents unfit to raise their child. The more 
problematic statutes embrace and seamlessly 
correlate 58 intellectual disability with 
parental unfitness and ineptitude. 
Now, when a state child welfare 
agency believes a child is abused or 
neglected, it may seek to take remove the 
child when the state judiciary grants such 
action, and termination of parental rights is 
on the table. 59 In termination of parental 
rights proceedings, most states require the 
court to determine: (I) by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that reunification efforts 
were reasonable; (2) by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a parent is unfit; and (3) that 
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severing the parent-child relationship is m 
the child's best interest. 60 Every state 1s 
responsible for establishing their statutory 
grounds for termination. 
C. State Statutes Addressing 
Intellectual Disability 
Approximately two-thirds of states 
have statutes that include intellectual 
disability as a factor for terminating parental 
rights if the state perceives the disable 
parent unable, or unfit to care for the child. 61 
The remaining 15 states do not include 
intellectual disability in their termination of 
parental right statutes. The 3 5 states that do 
are: Alabama 62 , Alaska 63 , Arkansas 64 , 
A
. 65 
nzona , C 1
. C" • 66 a 11orma , Colorado 67 , 
Delaware 68 , District of Columbia 69 , 
G . 70 H .. 71 Ill. . n I 73 eorgia , awan , mois , owa , 
Kansas 74 , Kentucky 75 , Maryland 76 , 
M h n M. · · ·78 M. .79 assac usetts , 1ss1ss1pp1 , 1ssoun , 
Montana 80 , Nebraska 81 , Nevada 82 , New 
H h. 83 N J 84 N M . 85 amps Ire , ew ersey , ew ex1co , 
New York 86 , North Carolina 87 , North 
Dakota88 , Ohio89 , Oklahoma 90 , Oregon 91 , 
South Carolina 92 , Tennessee 93 , Texas 94 , 
V. . . 95 w h. 96 d w· . 97 98 Irg1ma , as mgton an 1sconsm . 
No one statute is a mirror-image of the 
another statute. The language varies. This 
variance is discussed below. 
1. A Minority of States 
Employ Narrow Statutory Language 
Within the two-thirds of states that 
include intellectual disability as a factor for 
terminating parental rights, there are only a 
handful of states that do not use overly 




and Wisconsin. Their 
termination of parental rights statutes 
specifically include narrow language on the 
type of intellectual disability being targeting 
by the state. 99 
The state of Mississippi is one such 
state to accomplish a narrowly tailored 
statute addressing the matter of intellectual 
disability as grounds for parental rights 
termination. Mississippi's statute reads: "If 
established by clear and convmcmg 
evidence," 100 grounds for termination of the 
parent's parental rights is appropriate, if 
reunification between the parent and child is 
not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory 
permanency outcome: 
The parent has been 
medically diagnosed by a 
qualified mental health 
professional with a severe 
mental illness or deficiency 
that is unlikely to change in a 
reasonable period of time and 
which, based upon expert 
testimony or an established 
pattern of behavior, makes 
111 
the parent unable or 
unwilling to provide an 
adequate permanent home for 
the child. 101 
Mississippi uses the term "severe"102 
in its language when addressing a parent's 
intellectual disability. 103 It is cl ear the state 
of Mississippi requires a history of behavior 
connected to a "severe" 104 disability by 
mandating a pattern of behavior be 
established to empirically prove the parent is 
truly unfit to provide for the child. 
Another state that narrows its 
language when addressing intellectual 
disability as a ground for termination of 
parental rights is the state of Washington. 
Washington's termination of parental right 
statute allows for the court to consider: 
Psychological incapacity or 
mental deficiency of the 
parent that is so severe and 
chronic as to render the 
parent incapable of providing 
proper care for the child for 
extended periods of time or 
for periods of time that 
present a risk of imminent 
harm to the child and 
documented unwilling~ess of 
the parent to receive and 
complete treatment or 
documentation that there is 
no treatment that can render 
the parent capable of 
providing proper care for the 
child in the near future. 105 
Per the language of Washington's 
statute, the state requires a parent's 
intellectual disability be "so severe and 
h . " 106 h . 1 c romc t at 1t p aces the child in 
imminent harm 107 L"k . 1 e Mississippi, 
Washington narrows the overbroad and 
rather ambiguous definition of intellectual 
disability. 108 Interesting! y, unlike 
Mississippi, Washington provides a second 
prong to this ground for termination by 
requiring documentation of the parent's 
"unwillingness" 109 to receive and complete 
treatment, or that no such treatment would 
render proper, future care of the child. 110 In 
effect, Washington seems to be com batting 
bias and presumption by placing a higher 
burden on the state to convey an unfit 
intellectually disabled parent or parents. 
The state of Virginia parallels the 
narrow language employed by Mississippi 
and Washington. In Virginia's termination 
of parental rights statute, the language reads 
as follows: 
The parent or parents have a 
mental or emotional illness or 
intellectual disability of 
such severity that there is no 
reasonable expectation that 
such parent will be able to 
undertake responsibility for 
the care needed by the child 
in accordance with his age 
and stage of development. 111 
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Dissimilar to Mississippi and 
Washington, Virginia uses the phrase 
"intellectual disability" 112 in its statute. 
Virginia categorizes intellectual disability by 
the 'severity' of one's mental state 113 Thus, 
Virginia conscientiously disallows state 
actors from terminating parental rights on a 
basis other than a parent's severe intellectual 
disability .114 
Termination of parental rights in 
other states share similar goals to the 
aforementioned states. However, these states 
do not use "severe" or "severity" to classify 
intellectual disability. Instead, these states 
use alternative terms or restrictive language 
to classify the different intellectual 
disabilities. For example, the statutory 
section regarding a parent's intellectual 
disability as a ground for termination in the 
state of Wisconsin's says: 
Continuing parental 
disability, which shall be 
established by proving that: 
The parent is presently, and 
for a cumulative total period 
of at least 2 years within the 
5 years immediately prior to 
the filing of the petition has 
been, an inpatient at one or 
more hospitals. . . licensed 
treatment facilities ... or state 
treatment facilities. . . on 
account of . . developmental 
disability. 115 
The phrase "developmental disability" 116 is 
defined by Wisconsin as: 
a disability attributable to 
intellectual disability. . . or 
another neurological 
condition closely related to 
an intellectual disability or 
requiring treatment similar to 
that required for individuals 
with an intellectual disability, 
which has continued or can 
be expected to continue 
indefinitely, substantially 
impairs an individual from 
adequately providing for his 
or her own care or custody, 
and constitutes a substantial 
handicap to the afflicted 
individual. 117 
Wisconsin's definition of developmental 
disability does not contain any reference to 
the severity of one's mental state. 118 Instead 
the definition utilizes the phrase 
"substantially impairs an individual" 119 with 
an intellectual disability. 12° Consequently, 
when Wisconsin's termination of parental 
rights statute is read in conjunction with the 
definition section, it is clear the state's 
approach to termination 1s narrowly 
confined to situations involving a period of 
recent institutionalization for an intellectual 
disability that impairs the parent to a 
substantial degree. 
Mississippi, Washington, Virginia 
and Wisconsin are not the only states 
narrowmg their statutory language 
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surrounding intellectual disability as a 
ground for termination. The states of 
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and New 
Hampshire implement language most similar 
to that of Wisconsin. 121 But, there is a key 
difference between Wisconsin's language 
and three of these four states mentioned 
above. As previously stated, Wisconsin uses 
"substantially impairs an individual," 122 
when defining the severity of intellectual 
disability. Delaware, Illinois and Kentucky 
use language like, "significantly sub-average 
general intellectual functioning" 123 when 
defining intellectual disability. Refer back to 
the general definition of intellectual 
disability in this article and the problem is 
clear; the latter language used defines the 
intellectual disability monolithically. 
Intellectual disability is a sub-average 
intellect of an individual, so this definition 
offers nothing more than simply defining the 
disability in its most general form. 
2. A Majority of States 
Employ Overbroad Statutory 
Language 
The remaining states and the District 
of Columbia use overbroad language in their 
statutes addressing intellectual disability as a 
ground for termination of parental rights of a 
child. These states are the antithesis to states 
like Kentucky, Mississippi, Virginia, 
Washington and Wisconsin. 
For example, the state of New York 
has overbroad statutory language when 
addressing intellectual disability as a ground 
for termination. New York's statute reads: 
The parent or parents. . . are 
presently and for the 
foreseeable future unable, by 
reason. intellectual 
disability, to provide proper 
and adequate care for a child 
who has been in the care of 
an authorized agency for the 
period of one year 
immediately prior to the date 
on which the petition is filed 
in the court. 124 
New York's termination statute attempts to 
connect a parent's intellectual disability to 
the capacity of the parent to provide care to 
child, yet it offers no language that narrows 
the class of intellectually disabled parents. 125 
New York's use of "intellectual 
disability" 126 is overly broad and states in 
this majority employ comparable, overly 
broad language. 127 Due to New York's 
broad language, the statute doesn't account 
for how stratified the class of intellectually 
disabled parents are, and thus harms those 
parents who are fit to provide care. 
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III. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY 
ELIMINATED FROM STATUTOTY 
LAN GAUGE, BUT SHOULD 
NARROWLY ADDRESS THE CLASS OF 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 
While no state says that intellectual 
disability can be the sole ground for 
termination of parental rights, it can become 
. . 128 the focus of child protect10n cases. 
Accordingly, states should crystalize their 
statutes to reflect the heterogeneous group of 
individuals that are intellectually disabled 
parents. Most states, if not all, should 
parallel Mississippi, Washington, Virginia's 
statutory language because the language 
preempts non-severe intellectually disabled 
parents being swept into the scope of 
foreseeable child abuse and neglect, or 
general unfitness to provide for the child. 
The rights of an intellectually 
disabled parent should not hinge on a 
"compassionate judge that understands the 
. d" "d 1 ,,129 M issues faced by [these] m IVI ua s. ore 
importantly, parental rights should not hinge 
on unjustifiable, overly broad language in 
state statutes addressing termination of 
parental rights. Disability is the only 
instance in which it is acceptable and legal 
to terminate parental rights of a group of 
individuals based on a condition rather than 
130 . d . h" a behavior. As prev10usly state m t IS 
article intellectual disability IS not a 
' 
homogenous group of people. 
While, currently, parents with 
disabilities in many states may face 
discrimination m child custody and 
termination of parental rights proceedings, 
this can be changed. States need to 
reconsider the inclusion of disability in child 
custody codes. Highlighted in the discussion 
surrounding New York's termination statute, 
overly broad language doesn't account for 
the three immensely different classifications 
of intellectually disabled parents. Overly 
broad language and non-specific definitions 
of intellectual disability sweeps non-severe 
parents who are perfectly able to provide 
adequate, reasonable care for their child, 
under the deleterious rug of court ordered 
termination. States must evaluate their 
current language of termination of parental 
rights statutes and consider altering the 
language used to define intellectual 
disability as a ground for termination to 
reflect severe forms intellectual disability, 
like Mississippi, Virginia and Washington. 
States must be pressed upon to eliminate 
overly broad statutes and alternatively 
modify their statutes with terminology that 
is indicative of the varying classes of the 
intellectual disabled community. 
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A Addressing Environmental Risks 
Posed to Children Whose Parent Is 
Intellectually Disabled 
As addressed throughout this Article, 
individuals with intellectual disability are a 
diverse group, with a substantial, varying 
degree of "attitudes... aptitudes" and 
adaptability. 131 Understandably so, some 
concern may be raised when one thinks 
about the environment a child is subject to 
with a parent who falls within the mild or 
moderate class of intellectual disability. This 
level of concern and risk escapes few; even 
those advocating for stricter, narrow 
statutory language in termination of parental 
rights statutes. 
Notwithstanding this genume 
concern, researchers have often come to find 
that intellectually disabled parents exhibit 
"unexpected strengths" m parenting tests 
while providing their children with a 
growmg intellectually stimulating 
environment. 132 Parents with intellectual 
disability often have limited effect on a 
133 child's behavior and development. 
Ultimately, this class of parents are more 
likely to be successful parents and members 
of society when they "enjoy the virtues of 
1. ,,134 t interdependence and communa 1ty; no 
hindered by stereotypes and marginalization. 
Now a child can have "genetic and 
' 
environmental vulnerability" 135 if that child 
has an intellectually disabled parent or 
parents. This vulnerability can make them 
susceptible to extensive responsibilities at 
home, sub-par school performance, guilt and 
isolation, anti-social behaviors and various 
mental disorders. 136 However, it should be 
noted, children of substance abusers are 
almost three times more likely to be 
physically or sexually assaulted than other 
children, more than four times more likely to 
be neglected, and more likely to be 
137 substance abusers themselves. 
Ultimately, the classification of the 
intellectual disability may be "the most 
important predictors of parenting success" in 
fostering a safe, loving, enriching 
environment for their child. 138 Yet, evidence 
overwhelmingly displays that non-severe 
intellectually disabled parents can 
adequately and positively care for their 
children with, if needed, certain levels 
139 treatment and support. 
CONCLUSION 
Nothing stated above is saying every 
single actor in the legal system, and its 
agents across this nation routinely, 
systematically and purposely discriminates 
against intellectually disabled parents. To 
the contrary, there are a number of judges 
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who are enlightened on this particular 
disability and consequently deny termination 
for parents who have limited cognitive 
ability. 140 However, preservation of the 
family nucleus for these individuals cannot 
rely on the hope that their case gets assigned 
to an enlightened judge. 
Plenty of parents' rights are 
terminated because their intellectual 
disability does, or can, render them unfit to 
provide care for their child. In matters, 
similar to the Oregonian couple, 141 the state 
should not come running at the ring of the 
intellectual disability bell and remove a 
child from their mild or moderate 
intellectually disabled parent; especially 
when there is no finding of prima facia 
abuse or neglect. 
In conclusion, states must evaluate 
their current language of termination of 
parental rights statutes. States should 
consider altering their language to parallel 
'severe' language used by states like 
Mississippi, Virginia and Washington. In 
addition, states must be pressed upon to 
eliminate overly broad statutes and 
alternatively modify their statutes with 
terminology that is indicative of the varying 
classes of the intellectually disabled 
community. 
Thus, overly broad intellectual disability 
language in termination of parental rights 
statutes must cease because smarter people 
do not inherently make for better parents, so 
why penalize those parents with non-severe 
cognitive inability. When more states begin 
to follow Mississippi's and Washington's 
example of narrow statutory language, these 
states will be practicing more effective, 
more equitable family law. Justice is needed 
for this community. The family nucleus 
must be protected and preserved for all. 
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